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1. Introduction
The rather smooth establishment of the European monetary union (EMU) in spite,
Europe still faces a number of political and economic problems.  The most acute one
is the weak performance of various national labour markets.  Different lines of
research have been followed to address the causes of the rising European
unemployment.  One of the major efforts was the OECD Jobs Study (1994).  The
main conclusion from this study is that labour market institutions can explain much
of the rise in unemployment in various European countries.  Because labour market
institutions generally favour insiders, the interests of the outsiders will hardly be
taken into consideration at the bargaining table and cyclical unemployment tends to
become structural.  This is in line with the observation of rising equilibrium
unemployment accompanying the rise in total unemployment in Europe.  Labour
market institutions influence the pressure the unemployed exert on wages, i.e. the
responsiveness of wages to unemployment, commonly referred to as ‘real wage
flexibility’.  Layard, Nickell and Jackmann (1991) showed that cross-country
differences in labour market institutions can account for differences in wage
flexibility.  Proper redesigning of labour market institutions should therefore
increase wage flexibility and reduce actual unemployment.
Blanchard and Katz (1997) argue however that the OECD approach faces some
conceptual and empirical problems.  According to their view institutions alone
cannot explain the rise in unemployment.  More recent work by Blanchard (1999a &
b) focuses on the interaction between shocks and institutions as an explanation for
the rise in European unemployment.  The shocks then explain the rise in
unemployment, while the institutions account for the differences among European
countries.  The study also acknowledges the possibility that changes in labour
market institutions over time have influenced unemployment (be it in combination
with shocks).  However, in a ‘traditional’ framework (as proposed by Layard et al.
(1991)) with unemployment as the dependent variable regressed upon shocks and
time-varying institutions, little evidence is found for the effect of changes in labour
market institutions over time.  Several other studies also provide empirical evidence
on the effect of labour market institutions on unemployment within this traditional
framework (e.g. Nickell (1997), Scarpetta (1996)).  But we are not aware of any
consistent econometric setting that explores the relationship between institutions
and wage flexibility over time within countries.  This is where the contribution of
this paper is situated.  We define wage flexibility as the coefficient of unemployment
in a ‘bargaining augmented’ wage equation, explaining wage growth.  A time-
varying parameter framework is then introduced to allow this coefficient to vary
with labour market institutions.  A significant relationship implies that (changes in)
institutions also account for part of the rise in unemployment through changes in
wage pressure.
Since the establishment of EMU, the wage flexibility issue has even become more
relevant.  With member countries being deprived of an independent monetary policy,
alternative adjustment mechanisms to deal with (asymmetric) shocks have to be
found.  One of the possibilities is to enhance wage flexibility.Generosity of the Unemployment Benefit System and Wage Flexibility in EMU:
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  In section 2 we point to the
need for more real wage flexibility in Europe and the possible influences of EMU on
real wage flexibility.  In section 3 a basic wage equation is introduced and estimated.
The relationship between labour market institutions and real wage flexibility is
discussed in section 4 together with the possibilities to enhance real wage flexibility
through labour market reform.  At the empirical level we test whether the
generosity of the unemployment benefit system, a labour market institution
characterised as of predominant importance in many studies, limits wage flexibility.
This was done through the estimation of the wage equation in a time varying
parameter framework, where we allowed the generosity of the unemployment
benefits to influence the parameter of the unemployment rate in the wage equation.
Section 6 concludes with our main findings.
2. Why Europe needs more wage flexibility
2.1 Europe’s lack of wage flexibility
As figure 1 shows, the evolution of the unemployment situation of the EMU-11
compares poorly with Japan and the USA.  In Japan unemployment rose from 1.2%
in 1970 to 3.5% in 1998, which is still very low, although it tripled.  In the USA
unemployment rose in the aftermath of the oil shocks, but decreased afterwards.  In
1998 unemployment was below 5% and it is still decreasing.  In Europe, on the other
hand, unemployment rose sharply in the same period from 2.3% to about 11% the
last few years.  Being an average this series of course conceals widespread
differences between European economies, but the five economies we are focussing on
below (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and The Netherlands) all experienced about
the same unfavourable evolution.
To explain the poor performance of Europe, it is interesting to study the reaction of
its labour market during and after the oil shocks of 1973-1974 and 1979-1980 in
comparison to the USA and Japan.  Let us first consider the case of Japan.  As can
be seen in figure 1, unemployment rose only slightly after the oil shocks.  A possible
explanation is the higher real wage flexibility in Japan1.  Based on estimates for the
period 1964-1994, McMorrow (1996) finds that unemployment would have to
increase by 0.1, 1.3 and 1.8 percentage above the natural rate in Japan, the US and
the European Union respectively to offset the inflationary consequences of a real
shock which temporarily increased inflation by one percentage point.  So in Japan
unemployment had to rise only little for wages to lower and accommodate for the oil
shocks.
                                                       
1 Wage flexibility in Japan is over four times larger than in the USA and EU according to the estimates
of McMorrow (1996).Plasmans J., Meersman H., Van Poeck A. & Merlevede B , 3
Figure 1: Evolution of the unemployment rate in the EMU-11, USA and Japan
Source: OECD Statistical Compendium, Economic Outlook
On the basis of McMorrow’s analysis, one would expect unemployment to rise
significantly in the USA and the EU after the oil shocks, which is confirmed in
figure 1.  In the USA however unemployment returns more or less to the pre-shock
level, whereas European unemployment remains high.  To explain this one generally
takes up the idea of the highly flexible American labour market versus the rigid
European labour market.  Since European labour market institutions tend to favour
employed insiders, the increased level of unemployment does not result in a
considerable downward pressure on wages.  By consequence the bulk of cyclically
unemployed persons become long-term unemployed, resulting in even less
opportunities to have an impact on wage formation and in an increase in the natural
rate of unemployment.  At the empirical level this is confirmed by Heylen and Van
Poeck (1995) who illustrate that EU countries are characterised by more persistence
in their unemployment than the USA.  In this context Mcmorrow (1996) also points
to the much higher employment adaptability in the USA than in the EU.  This
means that, when the economy recovers from the shock, employment in the USA
responds quicker to rising output and thus unemployment will decrease faster than
in Europe (see also De Grauwe (1998)).  To a certain extent this difference in
employment adaptability can also be traced down to differences in labour market
institutions (e.g. less stringent employment protection legislation in the USA).
Proper redesigning of labour market institutions should therefore improve real wage
flexibility (or employment adaptability), resulting in more downward pressure on
wages (or a faster response of employment), reducing unemployment as such.
However, as pointed out by Nickell (1997), merely stating that unemployment in
Europe is higher than in the USA because European labour market institutions
result in a more rigid labour market is too large a simplification.  Nickell (1997)
shows that “many labour market institutions that conventionally come under the
heading of rigidities have no observable impact on unemployment.”  We come back
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The previous analysis illustrates that Europe needs more real wage flexibility or
employment adaptability.   As from here we will focus on wage flexibility.  With
highly flexible wages, a country can afford a certain degree of employment rigidity,
such as in Japan, where even a small rise in unemployment  results in considerable
wage moderation.
2.2 EMU increases the need for real wage flexibility
Since the establishment of EMU, member-countries are deprived of an independent
national monetary policy.2  This only increases the need for real wage flexibility.  In
the past national monetary policy could be used to stabilise output and employment
after a country was hit by an asymmetric shock.  There is however no consensus
about the likelihood of these asymmetric shocks.  Pissarides (1997) concludes from
the examination of actual GDP data since 1950 that if the countries in the core
formed a union the likelihood of large country-specific shocks would be small.
Concerning the labour market, Viñals and Jimeno (1996) conclude (from historical
evidence) that common European forces seem to have been very important in
explaining national unemployment rates.  Others (e.g. Krugman (1991)) are
convinced that asymmetric shocks are very likely.  To be on the safe side, alternative
adjustment mechanisms have to be found to enable countries in the periphery and, if
necessary, core countries to cope with asymmetric shocks.  Possible alternatives
include labour mobility, fiscal policy, and price and wage flexibility.
It is clear that labour mobility could have an equilibrating effect in case of an
asymmetric shock.  If labour moves to where it is needed, aggregate demand could
change without too many consequences for employment.  Because of cultural and
linguistic barriers, labour mobility is limited in Europe.  Eichengreen (1993)
illustrates this very well: “Americans move between U.S. states about three times as
frequently as Frenchmen move between départements and Germans move between
länder.”
Another way of dealing with asymmetric shocks is fiscal policy.  Note that there is no
E(M)U-wide fiscal policy, implying that there is no uniform tax system at the E(M)U
level that could have a stabilizing effect.  The scope for national governments to
conduct a discretionary fiscal policy is also restricted since under EMU budget
deficits are restricted to less than 3% of GDP and member countries agreed to work
towards a balanced budget.  Therefore fiscal policy can be ruled out as an option to
deal with asymmetric shocks at present.
The last alternative adjustment mechanism is price and wage flexibility.  E.g. if
aggregate demand falls, the economy will slide into a recession, with higher
unemployment and lower factor utilisation as a result.  This will have a depressing
effect on wages and prices.  They will rise slower relatively to other member states
or even decrease, which will bring about the depreciation of the real exchange rate
and a rise in net exports.  However, as wages (and prices) are rigid in Europe, this
process occurs only very slowly, allowing persistence effects to work on
                                                       
2 Some EU-countries were de facto already deprived of an independent monetary policy when they
started pegging their exchange rate to the DM.Plasmans J., Meersman H., Van Poeck A. & Merlevede B , 5
unemployment.  In a situation of flexible exchange rates, the immediate adjustment
of the exchange rate would exclude persistence effects (Pissarides (1997)).
Given the limited availability of fiscal policy, EMU member states should
concentrate their efforts on improving price and wage flexibility and/or labour
mobility.   One could also think of “direct” alternatives for fiscal policy, such as
Calmfors (1998b), who proposes variations in payroll taxes paid by employers,
compensated by changes in other taxes or government expenditures (thus leaving
the fiscal balance unchanged) as a substitute for exchange rate changes.  However,
unless an automatic system for these variations is installed, this alternative is likely
to suffer from inertia in the political decision process.
2.3 The effect of EMU on real wage flexibility is uncertain
It is interesting to examine how EMU -being a regime change- influences the
flexibility of wages.  Economic agents just might behave differently in the new
environment, resulting in a changed degree of flexibility.  From a theoretical point of
view different scenarios are possible (see Calmfors et al. (1997), Heylen (1998),
Pissarides (1997) and Van Poeck (1997)).  Calmfors (1998b) makes a distinction
between the direct and the indirect response of wage setters.  The latter results from
governments having an incentive to implement labour market reforms in order to
achieve more real wage flexibility.
Concerning the direct response of wage-setters, a change in bargaining behaviour of
employers and employees -given the existing labour market institutions- as a
reaction to the establishment of EMU may result in different bargaining outcomes
and a change in money-wage flexibility.  From the existing literature Calmfors
(1998b) concludes that  “the unsatisfactory state of knowledge regarding the causes
of money-wage rigidity makes it difficult to predict to what extent EMU-membership
will contribute to more money-wage flexibility; both theoretical reasoning and
empirical experiences would seem to warn against too great optimism.”
If an EMU-member faces a larger demand variability, this will induce a reduction in
contract length because the cost of a fixed-term wage contract increases with output
variability.  Qualitatively, flexibility clearly increases, while quantitatively, the
effect might be rather small because of the existence of externalities3.  The effect of
EMU on wage flexibility should also be qualified in another way: employees with a
secure job might just not take flexibility issues into account when negotiating for
new wages, because they have no interest in it (Calmfors et al. (1997)).  If
unemployment rises, this happens to a great extent to the detriment of young and
recently hired workers, leaving older employees untouched.  To the extent that these
insiders dominate wage setting, the effect of EMU on flexibility will be reduced.
Nevertheless, employers might still want to take flexibility into account to protect
their business in case of an asymmetric shock.
Another issue is the enlarged transparency of wages.  This could have a serious
impact on wage setters.  Bearing in mind the evolution of the wages in Eastern
                                                       
3 If all other firms in society reduce the length of their contracts such that the variability in demand for
the remaining firm is unchanged, it has no longer an incentive to reduce the length of its own contracts
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Germany after the unification, it is not difficult to imagine a scenario of perverse
wage catching-up in the low-wage countries of the union, without a rise in labour
productivity.  Unions in high-wage countries might react by bargaining higher
wages in order to stick to their relative wage positions (Peters (1995)), resulting in
an upward wage spiral.4
This brings us to the influence of the government on wage flexibility through labour
market reform.  Proper labour market reform is aimed at enhancing outsiders’
bargaining power in wage negotiations (i.e. at increasing wage flexibility). This type
of reform leads to lower bargained wages at the existing unemployment level and,
consequently, to a lower unemployment rate.  The changes in the nominal wage then
reflect an evolution to a new equilibrium level of employment.  In this new
equilibrium the higher real wage flexibility implies faster reactions of wages to rises
in unemployment as a consequence of a shock.  Proper labour market reform is
therefore welfare improving.  This is confirmed by van Aarle et al. (1999).  From a
simulation study they conclude that higher labour market flexibility entails
considerable welfare gains w.r.t. macro-economic adjustment in an EMU-setting (i.e.
with fixed exchange rates).
There are however some political constraints to labour market reform: employed
insiders will oppose to reforms because their wages are lowered, their exposure to
unemployment is increased and -when unemployment benefits are reduced- the
consequence of job loss is more severe.  Moreover unemployed outsiders are likely to
be the first to oppose to reforms that e.g. lower their unemployment benefits.
Calmfors (1998a) investigates differences in incentives for labour market reform for
countries inside and outside a monetary union.  National governments are assumed
to attach a cost to the divergence of unemployment from the unemployment goal, to
the divergence of inflation from the inflation goal and to labour market reform.  The
latter is a cost because labour market reform harms the employed insiders, who also
are the political majority. Welfare improvements of reform are twofold: on the one
hand unemployment is reduced, on the other hand the lower equilibrium
unemployment reduces the inflation bias for the monetary authority.  The net effect
of belonging to a monetary union (relative to being outside one) is however
ambiguous. Reform in an individual country reduces EMU-wide equilibrium
unemployment to a small extent and therefore has only a small effect on aggregate
inflation.  This lies at the heart of the problem, the combination of national labour-
market policy  and a common monetary policy meaning that each member country in
the EMU internalises only a fraction of the benefits of reform (see Calmfors (1998a)).
Whereas EMU clearly increases the need for real wage flexibility, it remains unclear
whether national governments will actually increase reform of labour market
institutions.
In conclusion, the effects of EMU on (real) wage flexibility are very difficult to
predict.  Qualitatively EMU-membership is likely to increase flexibility (w.r.t. wage
setters’ behaviour).  The quantitative effect however might be very small if wage
setters fail to internalise the externalities accompanying reductions in
                                                       
4 A downward wage spiral (cf. wage dumping) should not be excluded a priori but given that the EU
prefers to have some social safety net, this is less likely to occur (Pissarides (1997)).Plasmans J., Meersman H., Van Poeck A. & Merlevede B , 7
contract-length or if insiders dominate wage setting.  Nevertheless proper labour
market reform is welfare improving, it is not clear whether national governments
will actually bring (more) reforms into force.
In the remainder of the paper we take it for granted that Europe needs more real
wage flexibility.  We explore whether labour market reform can improve real wage
flexibility.
3. The wage equation
3.1 Justification of the specification for the wage equation
Empirical findings suggest a Phillips curve relationship between wages and
unemployment, i.e. a negative relationship between the rate of change of wages and
the unemployment rate.  Theoretical models (such as bargaining models) suggest
however a negative relationship between the level of the wages and the
unemployment rate, given the reservation wage and the level of productivity.  This
is the so called wage curve relationship.  Blanchard and Katz (1999) reconcile the
theoretical and empirical specification of the wages-unemployment relationship by
interpreting the reservation wage as depending on productivity and lagged wages.
This results in the following specification:
t t t t t t t
e
t w t z U z pc w pc pc c w e d b j + D + - - - - - + = D - - - - ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1        (1)
where w and pc are the logarithms of the wage and (consumption) price level,
e denotes expectations, U is the unemployment rate and z is labour productivity.
Wage growth is determined by inflation expectations, the level of unemployment
(the Phillips curve effect), the change in productivity and an ‘error correction’ term
) ( 1 1 1 - - - - - t t t z pc w , implying an adjustment of real wages to (trend) labour
productivity over time.  In fact real wages adjust to marginal productivity, but
assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function, marginal productivity ( t t L Y ¶ ¶ )
equals average productivity ( t t t z L Y = ).  A specification along this line is a/o used
in OECD (1997) and is similar to the equation in the OECD’s macroeconomic model
INTERLINK, where some other variables may still be added (e.g. tax variables).
They estimate the following specification:
t t t t t t t t t w t t pc p z pc w U U pc c pc w e q j g b a + D - D + - - - D - - DD + = - D - - - - ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1  
       (2)
where p is the GDP-deflator and inflation expectations are assumed to be adaptive5.
Changes in unemployment are introduced to test for hysteresis effects6;
                                                       
5 Inflation expectations are a weighted average of current and lagged inflation.  Some rewriting of
equation (2) shows the following relationship between nominal wages and inflation:
Dwt = c + aDpct + (1-a)Dpct-1 + …Generosity of the Unemployment Benefit System and Wage Flexibility in EMU:
 Time-varying Evidence in five Countries
8
) ( t t pc p D - D is included to reflect the idea of unions (employees) searching for
compensation for changes in consumer prices (Dpct) and employers offering wages
which include compensation for changes in GDP-prices (Dpt).  This can be seen as a
proxy for the internal terms of trade of firms.  It indicates the degree to which firms
can influence the prices of their output (and consequently their degree of bargaining
power in terms of wage negotiations).  For our own estimations we add labour
productivity growth (Dzt), which is present in equation (1), a tax variable relating to
the employers  ) (
er T and a tax variable relating to the employees  ) (
es T  to the set of
regressors in the OECD-specification.  The specification we estimate then becomes
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A theoretical justification of this “bargaining augmented Philips curve” can already
be found in Knoester and Van der Windt (1987).  Wage growth in the private sector
(Dw) is shown to be the outcome of negotiations between unions and employers, more
specifically a weighted average of wage growth claims of unions and wage growth
offers of employers.  Unions’ claims are assumed to reflect compensation for changes
in consumer prices (Dpc), labour productivity growth in the private sector (Dz) and
the burden of direct taxes and social security contributions (Tes).  Employers’ offers
are derived from marginal productivity conditions for profit maximising firms.  The
wage offers are shown to include compensation for changes in GDP-prices (Dp),
changes in labour productivity (Dz) and a correction for employers’ social security
contributions (Ter).  Finally the Philips curve effect is introduced by the assumption
that the respective bargaining power of unions and employers depend on the labour
market situation, reflected by the unemployment level (Ut).
3.2 Estimation results
Equation (3) is estimated by OLS.7  A “general-to-specific” approach8 is used to
identify the variables significantly influencing wage growth (for later use in a time-
varying framework).  The sample consists of annual observations for the period
1960-1995 and the variables are taken from OECD Statistical Compendium,
                                                                                                                                                                    
The closer a to one, the larger the influence of current inflation (a = 1 is full indexation) and
consequently a small effect of lagged inflation.  Note that in this specific setting with adaptive
expectations nominal and real wage flexibility (with real wage wt –pct-1) can be used interchangeably.
6 In a Phillips curve type equation, wage growth in fact depends on the gap between actual and
equilibrium unemployment.  If the equilibrium rate is assumed to be constant, it can be subsumed to be
in the constant term in the wage equation.  If, however, the equilibrium rate itself depends on the
actual rate (e.g. a long(er) period of unemployment eventually leads to the deterioration in skills and
motivation; the pressure exerted on the labour market becomes smaller, the negative effect of
unemployment on wages disappears in the long run), there is hysteresis and, consequently, wage
growth will be influenced by past changes in the unemployment level.
7 Using instruments to account for possible simultaneity bias and inconsistency does not alter the
results significantly, this is also confirmed by OECD (1997).
8 See Hendry (1995); the technique used also accounts for possible multicollinearity among the
explanatory variables.Plasmans J., Meersman H., Van Poeck A. & Merlevede B , 9
Economic Outlook (1998).  w, pc, p and z are expressed in logarithms (prices and
wages are denoted in home currency), the unemployment rate is expressed in levels
(as a decimal).  Wages and productivity refer to the private sector.  For the
construction of the error correction term trend labour productivity (based on a
Hodrick-Prescott filter) is used rather than actually measured productivity.
The best results are shown in table 1.  The adjusted R² is fairly high for all wage
growth equations and the Durbin-Watson statistic is above the inconclusive region
for all equations, except for Germany, where it is close to the upperbound (1.08-
1.89).  Because in the case of Belgium and Germany estimation results were very
poor (especially with respect to the error correction term) over the entire period but
quite good for the 1970-1995 subperiod9 a dummy variable was included in the
regression for the 1960-1969 subperiod.  Given the negative sign, this might be
related to the Newell-Symons “wage explosion” dummy for the seventies (see Layard
et al. (1991)).  Layard et al. (1991) also use this dummy but carry it through to the
end of their sample period (1990) because of the not suitable original dating.
The tax variables proved to be insignificant, perhaps because the variables are not
disaggregated enough or because of a too limited sample size (starting in 1970).  We
opted not to go into further detailed tax measures because –given the limited sample
size- we prefer a parsimonious specification.  Changes in unemployment turned out
to be insignificant too, i.e. there is none of the countries an indication of hysteresis
effects.  This turns out to be in line with other estimations (see e.g. Lauer (1999) and
OECD (1997)).  Using different sample periods they find no or only marginal
significance (hardly 10% for the Italian and German estimates in both studies).
The unemployment level enters significantly in all five wage equations.  Only in
Italy the point estimate of the |b|-coefficient (1.37) is significantly higher than in the
other countries.  Since the Italian unemployment benefit system is extremely strict
(see OECD (1994)) this might be a crude indication that generosity matters for the
level of real wage flexibility.  Flexibility in the other countries is about 0.6; an
increase of one percentage point in unemployment then increases the downward
pressure on wages exerted by unemployment with 0.6%.   The rising unemployment
following the oil crises did have a significant mitigating effect on wage growth.  The
effect was too small however to get unemployment down.  The error correction term
always enters significantly with the expected negative sign.  If wages in the previous
period were higher than the productivity level, this has a mitigating effect on wage
growth in the current period.  The coefficients of unemployment and the error term
do not seem to be in contradiction with OECD (1997).
Exception made of Belgium, the coefficient on inflation growth is close to one.  This
implies that in Belgium current inflation is not immediately passed entirely into
wage growth, therefore lagged inflation still has an impact on wages.  Changes in
productivity have a significant positive influence on wages in Belgium, Germany and
The Netherlands.   ) ( t t pc p D - D turns out to be significant for wage formation in
France, Germany and Italy.  The degree to which firms can influence the prices of
their output is probably smaller in Belgium and The Netherlands, two small open
                                                       
9 Most recent empirical work uses samples starting in 1970 (see e.g. OECD(1997) and Lauer (1999)).
Given the fact that we want to estimate the wage equation in a time-varying parameter framework,
restricting ourselves to the 1970-1995 period implies a considerable loss of observations.Generosity of the Unemployment Benefit System and Wage Flexibility in EMU:
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economies; hence the insignificance of the difference between GDP-prices and
consumer prices.Plasmans J., Meersman H., Van Poeck A. & Merlevede B , 11
Table 1: Wage equations - dependent variable: D(wt – pct-1)
(standard errors between brackets) 10
Belgiuma France Germanya Italy The
Netherlands





























































Adj. R² 0.88 0.92 0.94 0.89 0.88
DW 1.85 1.75 1.78 2.16 1.76
___________________
a dummy: 1962-1969=1
                                                       
10 Estimating a Seemingly Unrelated Regression model yields the following results.  Pooling the data
adds little to our analysis, only in case of The Netherlands the terms of trade is now significant at the
10% level.  Wald tests reject the hypothesis of  equal coefficients across countries.
Belgiuma France Germanya Italy The
Netherlands
Sample 1962-1995 1963-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995
Const. 0.1875* 0.3645*** 0.3643*** 3.1933*** 0.1520**
Dummy -0.0263** - -0.0341*** - -
DDpct 0.6627*** 0.8885*** 1.2273*** 1.0404*** 1.0662***
Ut -0.5881*** -0.7824*** -0.5117*** -1.3350*** -0.5019***
Dpt - Dpct 0.2506 0.3931* 0.9741*** 1.2641*** 0.9570*
Dzt 0.2799* -0.1594 0.7324*** 0.0403 0.4431***
wt-1 - pct-1 - zt-1 -0.0604** -0.1464*** -0.1710*** -0.3520*** -0.0574**
Adj. R² 0.88 0.93 0.94 0.89 0.89
DW 1.84 1.79 1.77 2.17 1.78
___________________
a dummy: 1962-1969=1
b * significant at the 10% level ** significant at the 5% level *** significant at the 1% levelGenerosity of the Unemployment Benefit System and Wage Flexibility in EMU:
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4. The wage equation in a time-varying parameter framework
4.1 Wage flexibility and labour market institutions
As already indicated in the introduction different labour market institutions can be
linked to the idea of wage flexibility.  Given our definition of (real) wage flexibility as
the responsiveness of (real) wages to unemployment, the parameter b (g=0 for all
countries) in equation (3) can be interpreted as a measure of (real) wage flexibility
(cf. footnote 5).  The relationship between responsiveness and labour market
institutions has already been investigated by e.g. Heylen and Van Poeck (1995),
Scarpetta (1996) and Viñals and Jimeno (1996).  A general consensus is that labour
market reform should involve a combination of reform of different labour market
institutions at the same time. We also confront some of the ‘standard’ intuitions
about the effects of these institutions with the critical view of Nickell (1997).
Although some empirical evidence was provided in several studies, we are not aware
of any consistent econometric setting that explores the relationship between real
wage flexibility and labour market institutions.  To a certain extent this due to the
limited availability of time series on labour market institutions.  Fortunately we
were able to construct a data series for the generosity of the unemployment benefit
system allowing us to provide some empirical evidence (see section 4.3).
For expositional simplicity we treat the labour market institutions one by one here
and define wage flexibility as the absolute value of the (semi-)elasticity of wages
w.r.t. unemployment11.  Based on earlier findings we then write the following
relationship between (real) wage flexibility and labour market institutions:
  -  +         n.l.      -         –
|b| = f(GUS, ALMP, CWB, EPL, TWC)         (4)
with: n.l.: non-linear
GUS:  generosity of the unemployment benefit system
ALMP: active labour market policies (expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP)
CWB:  degree of centralisation of wage bargaining
EPL:  degree of employment protection legislation
TWC:  type of wage contracts (reflecting average duration of wage 
contracts and synchronisation)
Generosity of the unemployment benefits
High and prolonged unemployment benefits are believed to worsen the persistence
and the level of unemployment.  Since being unemployed under a generous
unemployment benefit system is financially far less dramatic than under a stringent
one, the unemployed will have a lower job search intensity and a lower willingness
                                                       
11 Semi-elasticity since unemployment is measured as a percentage and no logarithmic transformation
is used.Plasmans J., Meersman H., Van Poeck A. & Merlevede B , 13
to work, which is reflected in a higher reservation wage.  Some persons might even
be caught in an unemployment trap, i.e. benefits are so high compared to the net
wage that it does not pay to be employed.  Furthermore, unions will anticipate (high)
unemployment benefits when negotiating wages and therefore adapt a more
aggressive strategy (less wage moderation).  In the present framework, a more
generous unemployment benefit system (GUS) will lead to less real wage flexibility,
denoted by the minus sign above GUS in (3).  Theoretically, unemployment benefits
could also have a positive impact on unemployment, because they give unemployed
the financial means to bridge the period of frictional unemployment.  We expect this
effect to be small, however, in comparison with the negative effects (see e.g. Heylen
and Van Poeck, 1995; Scarpetta, 1996 and Viñals and Jimeno, 1996).
The duration of entitlement should also be taken into account.  Nickell (1997) states
that “the impact of a relatively generous benefit system might be offset by suitable
active measures to push unemployed persons back to work.  Such policies seem to
work rather well when allied to a relatively short duration of benefit entitlement.”
(italics added).
Active labour market policies
Active labour market policies include training and re-training programmes for the
unemployed, as well as services to increase the allocational efficiency in the labour
market and job-creation policies.  They are expected to increase the skills of the
unemployed persons, which strengthens their competitiveness and increases the
pressure they can exert on the labour market.  Active labour market policies
therefore weaken the position of insiders.  This positively affects real wage
flexibility:  Faced with a mass of  competitive unemployed, insiders will be forced to
restrain their wage demands.  Increased effort of the government with regards to
active labour market policy will increase real wage flexibility.  In the end this will
result in higher employment.
Active labour market policies will also increase search effectiveness, thereby
reducing duration of unemployment.  In sum, more active labour market programs
will reduce both the level and persistence of unemployment.  Empirical studies (e.g.
Heylen (1993), OECD (1993) and Scarpetta (1996)) generally confirm this conclusion.
When distinguishing between job-creation and  training programms, the latter
seems to have a more favourable effects on employment (Johansson (1998)).
Moreover to the extent that active labour market policies increase the welfare of the
unemployed (e.g. higher unemployment benefits when participating in a programm),
they might even lower wage flexibility (Johansson (1998)).  These negative effects
are however only likely to occur with large programmes, suggesting a possible
non-linearity.  In practice only Sweden might suffer from these negative effects.
Level of wage bargaining
Highly centralised as well as fully decentralised wage bargaining levels seem to offer
the best results.  Calmfors and Driffill (1988) were the first to suggest the existence
of a hump-shaped relationship between the level of real wages and the degree of
centralisation of bargaining.  If bargaining is fully centralised, unions realise thatGenerosity of the Unemployment Benefit System and Wage Flexibility in EMU:
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moderate wage increases allow to incorporate several positive external effects, such
as lower unemployment, prices and taxes.  If bargaining takes place at the fully
decentralised level, market forces are allowed to work freely.  Individual workers
will then restrain wage demands, because they face the threat of job loss when the
firm loses competitiveness because of relatively high wage costs.
At the intermediate level of bargaining (sector-wide unions), however, no incentive
will be present to moderate wage demands.  Firstly, sector-wide unions will not be
faced with massive job losses for their members if they raise wages, because wages
will rise in the whole sector.  Hence, an individual firm faces no fall in demand
relative to other firms. There will only be some substitution to industries outside the
sector.  In open economies this should somewhat be qualified because of the
international competition.12  Secondly, the increased price level in the industry
resulting from higher wages, will not affect consumer prices very much.  Therefore,
the nominal wage increase will not be fully absorbed by higher prices (Calmfors and
Driffill (1988)).
It follows that wages will be more flexible when negotiations take place at the fully
centralised or decentralised level.  In this case |b| will be higher than when the
negotiations take place at an intermediate level.
Employment protection legislation
Employment protection legislation consists of all rules and laws that protect workers
from being fired (e.g. notice period, severance pay) and thus make dismissals costly.
It reduces employment variability, not only because it is more difficult and costly for
firms to fire workers during recessions, but also because firms become cautious in
hiring people during expansions, as they anticipate the difficulties in firing them
again.  Although this legislation might be appropriate to reduce arbitrary
dismissals, it seems an important obstacle when it comes to bringing unemployment
down.  According to Nickell (1997) the overall impact might nevertheless be rather
small because the reduced short-term unemployment and the raised long-term
unemployment would tend to cancel out.  However a more severe employment
protection legislation creates a dual labour market because it increases the power of
insiders.  The labour market then consists, on the one hand, of protected insiders
and, on the other hand, of outsiders, unable to find a job.  As already stated before,
insider power is shown to have an adverse impact on real wage flexibility (Heylen
and Van Poeck (1995), Scarpetta (1996) and Viñals and Jimeno (1996)).  By
consequence |b| in our framework is more likely to be negatively influenced by the
degree of employment protection legislation.  A more severe employment protection
legislation will then ceteris paribus lead to lower real wage flexibility, i.e. a smaller
|b|.
                                                       
12 e.g. in Belgium wage evolutions of important trade partners are taken into account to determine
maximum wage growthPlasmans J., Meersman H., Van Poeck A. & Merlevede B , 15
Wage contracts
The last variable influencing real wage flexibility consists of the type and duration of
wage contracts (see Calmfors et al. (1997)).  Wage agreements for a shorter period
lead to more nominal flexibility than long term contracts.  The degree of
synchronisation of wage negotiations might also be important.  When wage
agreements expire at different times, unions will take past wage increases in other
sectors into account and adapt their expectations accordingly.  Because wages tend
to be more rigid with lower synchronisation and longer term contracts, the
possibilities for the unemployed to exert downward pressure on wages will be
limited.  Since duration is expected to influence |b| negatively and synchronisation
positively, a plus-minus sign was used to denote the expected relationship in (3).
4.2 The time-varying parameter framework
The basic idea is the following: the unemployed exert downward pressure on wages.
Longer term unemployed however show decreasing search intensity and start to
loose skills, reducing their impact on wage formation or even making them totally
irrelevant for it.  Search intensity, skills, … are in turn influenced by labour market
institutions determining who can exert how much pressure on wages.  Therefore, the
parameter of the unemployment rate in the wage equation, reflecting wage
flexibility, is influenced by different labour market institutions.  Consequently we
cannot expect this parameter to be constant over time if the underlying institutions
change over time.  This hypothesis can be modelled in the following manner13:
t X t t t w t t C X u c pc w e b + + + = - D - ) ( 1        (5)
with   t V t t C V c u b b + + =
and    Xt := [ ) ( , ), ( , 1 1 1 t t t t t t t pc p z z pc w pc D - D D - - DD - - - ]
Vt := [GUS, ALMP, CWB, EPL, TWC]
This model can be characterised as a systematically varying-parameter framework.
For a mathematical description of the corresponding maximum likelihood estimation
method, we refer to appendix 1.  Since time series for most of the variables in the V-
vector are not available, it is impossible to estimate the entire model.  In the OECD
Jobs Study (1994) a two-yearly time series to measure generosity, labelled
replacement ratio, was constructed (cf. infra).  Since this is only a two-yearly series
(1961-1995), the number of observations (17) is too limited to use the varying-
parameter method.  To overcome this problem we created an annual time series
based on total expenditures for unemployment benefits, measuring the generosity of
the unemployment benefit system (GUS).
                                                       
13 Since the tax variables and changes in unemployment proved to be insignificant for all countries we
do not include them in Xt.Generosity of the Unemployment Benefit System and Wage Flexibility in EMU:
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The model to be estimated then becomes:





t      (6a)
where bt is stochastic and is assumed to vary according to:





t  and  t u  independent of  t j j , " e      (6b)
The model analyses the effect of (changes in) the generosity of the unemployment
benefit system on real wage flexibility.  Since bt is negative and a more generous
system decreases wage flexibility, we expect cGUS to be positive.  A general warning
holds however.  Labour market reform should include different labour market
institutions.  Reform of only one institution could result in an off-setting reaction by
wage setters with respect to the other institutions.  If e.g. unemployment benefits
become less generous, wage setters may bargain longer notice periods or higher
severance pays or conclude longer-term employment contracts.  This suggests a
careful interpretation of the impact of the generosity of the unemployment benefit
system in explaining wage flexibility.
Before proceeding to the estimation we need to determine the appropriate
transformation(s) of the expenditures on unemployment benefits to obtain a good
measure of the generosity of the benefit system.  Thinking about the ‘generosity’ of
unemployment benefits, there are several sides to the story: criteria that need to be
met in order to be eligible for unemployment benefits (e.g. an earlier employment
record), the duration of the entitlement and the level of the benefits (possibly related
to earnings in earlier work).  Total government expenditures on unemployment
benefits capture these aspects.  An increase in the level of unemployment benefits or
less severe entitlement criteria (i.e. a more generous system) imply ceteris paribus
an increase in the government’s expenditures.  The effect of a prolongation of the
entitlement duration can also be easily inferred from a time series on expenditures:
a prolongation implies ceteris paribus that unemployed persons who would
otherwise have lost their benefit entitlement in the next period, now still receive
benefits, resulting in higher expenditures.
To have a good measure of generosity some modifications are needed.  Expenditures
without any additional transformation do not adequately reflect generosity for an
increase in the number of unemployed results in an increase in expenditures.  We
define the following transformation: expenditures on unemployment benefits as a
percentage of GDP, divided by the number of unemployed expressed as a percentage
of total population (where GDP and unemployment benefits are measured both in
value or both in volume).  This is equivalent to expenditures per unemployed as a
percentage of per capita GDP.   This implies that when unemployment benefits are
not adjusted to the prevailing welfare level, measured by per capita GDP, the
generosity changes.  By using per capita GDP, a bias towards small countries is
ruled out.
The figures for total expenditures on unemployment benefits were taken from
Eurostat, “Social protection expenditures and receipts: 1980-1995” and calculated
back with growth rates of comparable data obtained from International LabourPlasmans J., Meersman H., Van Poeck A. & Merlevede B , 17
Organization (ILO), “The cost of social security”.  Additional data for the
transformations were taken from OECD, Statistical Compendium, 1998.
From figure 2 one can infer that according to our measure The Netherlands have the
most generous system over the entire period.  This also holds for the OECD
measure.  The observed spike (which is due to an increase in expenditures on
benefits, not to one of the other elements of the transformation) is also present in the
replacement ratio series of the OECD, with the notable difference that this series
remains at the higher level.  The Belgian system is also fairly generous and is -since
the mid seventies- almost as generous as the Dutch  system.  At the bottom end we
observe the almost non-existing Italian system.  Since benefits in Italy are so small
and since there are no large changes in the system, it does not make sense to
perform the time-varying estimation for Italy.14  The benefit systems of France and
Germany are somewhere in between.  The gradual increase in generosity in France
is a feature that -to a certain extent- is also present in the OECD replacement ratio
(cf. infra).
Figure 2: Expenditures on unemployment benefits per unemployed,
as a percentage of GDP per capita
Source: own calculations with data from OECD, Statistical Compendium, 1998 and Eurostat, “Social
protection expenditures and receipts” (calculated back with growth rates of comparable data obtained
from ILO, “The cost of social security”)
                                                       
14 We did test for the presence of a time-varying relationship between the coefficient of unemployment
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4.3 Empirical results
The variables of the OLS regressions in table 1 are used for the maximum likelihood
estimation of model (6a-b) in a time varying parameter setting.  We use (lagged)
logarithms and (lagged) changes in logarithms of the generosity measure in the
flexibility equation.  In appendix the joint likelihood function for the time-varying
model is derived, where error terms are assumed to be normally and independently
distributed.  It is shown that the maximisation of the likelihood function boils down
to the maximisation of a function F with respect to the variance-ratio, i.e. the ratio of
the variance of the error term of the wage flexibility equation and the variance of the
error term of the wage equation.  This maximisation can be solved by a simple
random search procedure.  We use a grid search procedure to find the variances-
ratio that (indirectly) maximises the likelihood function and as such we find the
most accurate estimates. To facilitate the comparison with the OLS estimations we
also report an average value of bt (bav).
In addition to that we tested four hypotheses in order to get an idea of the
significance of the estimated coefficients.  We computed test statistics for the
following hypotheses: TS1: l = 0, (where l is the ratio of the variances of u and e, cf.
appendix);  TS2: l = 0 L cGUS = 0;  TS3: l = 0 L cGUS = 0 L cb = 0 and TS4: l = 0 L cGUS
= 0 L cb = 0 L CX = 0.  If all four hypotheses are rejected we have a significant time
varying parameter model.  Rejection of hypotheses 3 and 4 respectively imply that
the unemployment rate, respectively the variables in the X-vector explain wage
growth in the time-varying model.  Since the selection of variables for the wage
equation in the varying parameter model is based on the estimations of the previous
section, it is not surprising that hypotheses 3 and 4 are rejected for all 4 (5)
countries.15  The main interest lies in hypotheses 1 and 2.  If hypothesis 1 is not
rejected our equation explaining the unemployment coefficient is only approximately
stochastic.  If at the same time hypothesis 2 is rejected we have that our GUS
variable has nevertheless a significant influence on the unemployment parameter.
This would imply an (approximately) exact relationship between b and the
generosity of the unemployment benefit system, which is very hard to defend.
Rejection of both hypotheses implies that the unemployment coefficient is constant
over time.
Estimation results
The estimation results are presented in table 2.  Hypotheses 1 and 2 are only
rejected in the case of Belgium.  This implies that in France, Germany, Italy and
The Netherlands (changes in) the generosity of the unemployment benefits did not
have a significant impact on wage flexibility over the period 1960-1995.  In Belgium
however, the generosity of unemployment benefits is a significant determinant of
wage flexibility over the period 1960-1995.  In three of the four estimations the
generosity measure has the expected sign.  The estimated values of the parameters
                                                       
15 One might argue that making the coefficient of unemployment time-varying, could change
conclusions with respect to the significance of other variables.   Although no explicit tests were
performed, the results below show that the non time-varying coefficents are fairly stable.  This can be
interpreted as an indication that making the coefficient of unemployment time-varying does not
significantly alter the results with respect to wage formation.Plasmans J., Meersman H., Van Poeck A. & Merlevede B , 19
of the variables in the wage equation have -as expected- approximately the same
values as their OLS-counterparts in table 1.  Figure 3 shows the estimated time-
varying wage flexibility based on log(GUS-1) and Dlog(GUS-1).  The series based on
the differences jumps up and down a lot, whereas the series based on levels
(logarithms) shows a much smoother pattern.  To some extent this is of course due to
the differences-levels distinction.  But given the fact that the standard deviations of
both series do not differ very much (res. 0.11 and 0.14), there seems to be a stronger
reaction to last year’s changes in generosity than to last year’s level of generosity
(also reflected in a higher value of the likelihood function).
Figure 3: Estimated time-varying real wage flexibility, |bt|,
based on log(GUS), Dlog(GUS-1) and the lagged replacement ratio
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Robustness issues
A first crude way of testing the robustness of the obtained results consists in using
the OECD replacement ratio series16.   We generated a series with yearly
observations by linearly interpolating17 the two-yearly replacement ratio series.  We
then re-estimated model (6a-b) with the (lagged) replacement ratio as measure of the
generosity of the unemployment benefits system.   The values for TS1 and TS2 are
in general higher for all countries, but the conclusions are very similar:  only in the
case of Belgium the replacement ratio significantly influences real wage flexibility
(see table 2).  In both cases the estimated cGUS has the right positive sign.  The
differences in the estimated cb and cGUS are due to the different magnitude of the
replacement ratio.  From the beginning of the 70s onwards the series based on the
lagged replacement ratio (see figure 3) and the one based on the lagged level of our
own measure show the same trend (correlation coefficient of –0.75).
                                                       
16 These series were taken from the OECD database on ‘Unemployment Benefit Entitlements and
Replacement Rates’.  The ‘replacement ratio’ is calculated as an average replacement rate (benefits over
income) over three periods of an unemployment spell (1st year, 2nd & 3rd year and 4th & 5th year), three
family types (single, with dependent spouse and with spouse in work) and two different levels of
previous earnings (at 100% & at 66.7% of average earnings).  For further details see OECD (1994).
17 Using a quadratic or cubic interpolation method did not alter the results.Plasmans J., Meersman H., Van Poeck A. & Merlevede B , 21
Table 2: Estimation results for the time-varying parameter model
Cw RWF (b b) CY a Max. F b
Cb b CGUS c b bav  d
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a The vector associated with g includes: [ ) ( , ), ( , , 1 1 1 t t t t t t t pc p z y pc w pc dummy D - D D - - DD - - - ]; for all
countries TS4 (as well as TS3) is rejected at the 1% level
b Maximum value of the loglikelihood function F, see appendix 1 for a description of F.
c *, **, *** denote rejection of TS2 at the 10%, 5% and the 1% level
d  *, **, *** denote rejection of TS1 at the 10%, 5% and the 1% levelPlasmans J., Meersman H., Van Poeck A. & Merlevede B , 23
In the above we let the generosity of the unemployment benefit system determine
who is relevant for wage formation.  When the relevant category of unemployed
persons -those influencing wage formation- is ex ante (and correctly) determined, one
would expect the relationship (if any) to break down within a country over time.  An
exception to this might be a situation where considerable changes in the
unemployment benefit system (or more general in institutions) occur at a ‘high’
frequency, implying large fluctuations in the future prospects for the relevant
unemployed facing a chance to become irrelevant.  In reality institutional changes
are most of the time only modest, with considerable changes only occurring at a very
low frequency.
In what follows we define the cyclically unemployed persons as the relevant
category.  The relevant category can then be determined as actual unemployment
minus equilibrium unemployment, defined as the non-accelerating wage rate of
unemployment (NAWRU).  The reader is referred to appendix 2 for a discussion of
the calculation of the NAWRU.
Before re-estimating model (6a-b) with cyclical unemployment, i.e. Ut-Ut*, where Ut*
is the calculated NAWRU-value, we re-estimated equation (3).  The best results
(obtained by the same procedure as in section 3) are given in table 3.  In all countries
the point estimate of the coefficient on unemployment is -as expected- higher.
Taking into account standard errors it only rose significantly in Belgium.  In
comparison with the results of table 1 productivity is no longer significant in
explaining wage growth in Belgium.18  Productivity in The Netherlands, on the other
hand, has a larger positive influence.  In France the internal terms of trade proxy is
no longer significant, but productivity is now.  This is also the case for the estimate
with the Italian data.  To deal with the poor Durbin-Watson statistic a lagged
dependent variable was included among the regressors.  All other coefficients do not
differ for the five countries in comparison with table 1.
When we used the variables found in table 3 for the estimation in a time varying
setting, we did not find a significant relationship between the GUS-transformation
(or the replacement ratio) and (real) wage flexibility.  It seems to be that the
influence of the cyclically unemployed persons on wage formation does not vary with
the generosity of the unemployment  benefit system.
Of course, the most interesting case is Belgium.  The results in this section indicate
that the generosity of the unemployment benefit system does not matter for wage
flexibility in Belgium if the relevant category is ex ante identified as the cyclical
unemployed persons.  Confronted with the evidence of a significant relationship
when using total unemployment and the significant rise in wage flexibility when
using cyclical unemployment, one would be tempted to conclude that the generosity
of the unemployment benefit system is an element that generates the distinction
between “relevant” and “irrelevant” for wage formation in Belgium.   This would
                                                       
18 That the higher coefficient on unemployment is not due to the fact that changes in productivity are
dropped can be seen from the following regression (which was not used because the low D-W statistic
pointed to autocorrelation, ‘error’ equals  1 1 1 - - - - - t t t z pc w ):
' ' 06 . 0 31 . 0 ) ( 91 . 0 56 . 0 02 . 0 14 . 0 ) (
*
1 1 error z U U pc dummy pc w t t t t t t - D + - - DD + - = - D - -
 (0.07)  (0.007)             (0.10)         (0.11)              (0.14)     (0.03)
adj. R² = 0.87 D-W = 1.59Generosity of the Unemployment Benefit System and Wage Flexibility in EMU:
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however be too strong a statement.  We can only state that the downward pressure
on wages by all unemployed  depends over time on the level of generosity, whereas
the pressure by cyclical unemployed -which is significantly larger-  does not depend
on it.  Naturally the reservations we made considering our NAWRU estimates a
fortiori apply here.
Table 3: Wage equations using cyclical unemployment
dependent variable: D(wt – pct-1) (standard errors between brackets)
Belgiuma France Germanya Italy The
Netherlands



























































D(wt/pct-1)-1 - - - 0.3480
(0.0981)
-
Adj. R² 0.85 0.87 0.93 0.83 0.84




Given the results above, we are confident that for Belgium the relationship between
wage flexibility and the generosity of unemployment benefits is present.  It is of
course possible that the effect of the generosity of unemployment benefits would be
modified if more labour market characteristics (and interactions) would be taken
into account.
Given the almost non-existence of the Italian unemployment benefit system and the
fact that there are only small changes in the generosity, it is straightforward not to
expect any time-varying behaviour of wage flexibility due to changes in generosity in
Italy.  This was confirmed by the data (results are not reported).
Although the French, German and Dutch unemployment benefit systems are also
quite generous and the systems show some (considerable) evolutions (cf. figure 2), we
find no evidence of a relationship between wage flexibility and the generosity of thePlasmans J., Meersman H., Van Poeck A. & Merlevede B , 25
unemployment benefit system.  There are three possible explanations for these
findings:
1) there is no relationship in reality, i.e. the changes over time in generosity are too
small to have an effect on flexibility or simply do not matter; 2) the datasets are too
limited to draw any firm conclusions and 3) there are interactions with other labour
market institutions that are not present in the estimated model (cf. Nickell (1997)).
Given these last remarks we are not able to make any definitive statements with
regards to these three economies.
5. Conclusions
The well-known comparison of the European labour market with its Japanese and
American counterparts reveal that Europe needs more real wage flexibility or
employment adaptability, irrespective of the EMU-aspect.  The deprivation of an
independent monetary policy as an instrument to deal with (asymmetric) shocks
under EMU only increases this need.  From the existing literature we learn that
paradoxically the effect of EMU on wage flexibility is not unidirectional positive.
The effect will depend on the reaction of wage setters as well as on the reaction of
the government.  The latter referring to the question whether national governments
will (have an incentive to) implement and/or increase labour market reform.
Using the existing literature we illustrate that different labour market institutions
determine who can exert how much pressure on wages.  We relate these different
labour market institutions to wage flexibility, indicating some possible advantageous
reforms.  Confrontation with the critical view of  Nickell (1997) teaches us that one
should not be too optimistic about the effects of labour market reform and that a
careful study is therefore needed to retrieve the optimal reform-mix.
At the empirical level we first estimated a ‘bargaining-augmented’ wage equation for
five important  EMU-countries, allowing us to identify (real) wage flexibility in these
countries as the parameter of unemployment in the wage equation.  Wage flexibility
in Italy -where the unemployment benefit system is very strict- proved to be
significantly larger than in other countries.
Then we proceeded with an estimation in a coherent time-varying setting, where we
allowed a transformation of the expenditures on unemployment benefits to influence
wage flexibility.  Given the very strict and stable unemployment benefit system in
Italy, a relationship between the generosity of unemployment benefits and wage
flexibility is not expected.  This was confirmed by the data.  For Belgium we find a
significant time-varying influence of the generosity of the unemployment benefit
system on wage flexibility.  For France, Germany and The Netherlands we do not
find an indication of such a relationship.  These results are confirmed when using
the OECD measure for generosity of the unemployment benefits.  Although no other
institutions (nor interactions with them) are considered, we are quite confident that
in Belgium the relationship between wage flexibility and the generosity of
unemployment benefits holds.  Concerning France, Germany and The Netherlands
we find no evidence on such a relationship, but due to our limited datasets we are
not able to draw any definitive conclusions.  Therefore the possibility of a time-Generosity of the Unemployment Benefit System and Wage Flexibility in EMU:
 Time-varying Evidence in five Countries
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varying relationship between wage flexibility and labour market institutions in
general should not be excluded for these countries.
When we determine the relevant category of unemployed (influencing wage
formation) ex ante as actual unemployment minus equilibrium unemployment, we
find that this category of unemployed persons has a significantly larger negative
impact on wage formation in Belgium.  In the other countries the coefficient is also
higher, though not significantly.  In this case, the generosity of the unemployment
benefits does no longer limit wage flexibility in Belgium.  This also holds for the
other countries.  In the case of Belgium, given the previously found significant
relationship when using total unemployment, this is an indication that the
generosity of the unemployment benefits is an important element in determining to
what extent which type of unemployed persons can exert pressure on wages in
Belgium.Plasmans J., Meersman H., Van Poeck A. & Merlevede B , 27
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Appendix 1: Estimation of  time-varying parameter models
Consider the following model:
t t t t t w x y e g b a + + + = 0 (1)
with: t t t z u d a b + + = (2)
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l = , we find from substitution of (2) in (1):
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The joint loglikelihood-function for n observations is then given by:
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Now determine the optimal estimator for the constant term a0.  The first order
condition gives:
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Define the sum of squared residuals (SSQ) as follows:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ￿
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The loglikelihood-function then can be written as:
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For a given value of l we find from OLS (14) the estimators for a, g and d which can
be substituted back in the loglikelihood-function.  This results in:
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which is of the form: ( ) ( ) l l s g d a a e F c L + = ~ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ log 0 (16)
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Maximisation of the likelihood-function (3) is thus equal to the maximisation of (17)
with respect to l, which can be solved by e.g. a random search procedure.Generosity of the Unemployment Benefit System and Wage Flexibility in EMU:
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Appendix 2: NAWRU calculations
The labour market equilibrium is assumed to be at the natural rate of
unemployment or the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU).
Part of the literature on ‘NAIRU’ focuses on the use of the NAIRU for policy making,
our main interest, however, is to use the NAIRU for the calculation of ‘cyclical
unemployment’ (i.e. actual unemployment minus NAIRU).  That the computation of
a consistent NAIRU is not that straightforward is illustrated by Blanchard and Katz
(1997).  The main conclusion from their study of the literature is that considerable
theoretical progress has been made, but that “the empirical knowledge sadly lags
behind” and that “economists are a long way from having a good quantitative
understanding of the natural rate, either across time or across countries” (Blanchard
and Katz (1997), p.52).
On the theoretical plan a framework has emerged, built around two central ideas.
The first is that the labour market is characterised by large flows into and out of
unemployment.  This implies the existence of some optimal level of frictional
unemployment.  The other central idea is that in general the relations between
employers and employees are such that wage setting differs from competitive wage
setting.  This implies that the observed actual unemployment level will differ from
the efficient frictional unemployment level.
At the empirical level, different approaches to the computation of the NAIRU can be
found in the literature. Since the NAIRU is an unobservable quantity, certain
assumptions are needed to identify it.  A first possibility is to use statistical
assumptions in order to detect long run trends in equilibrium unemployment (e.g.
Douven (1999)).  Another possibility is to start from a certain model (using economic
assumptions), where equilibrium unemployment then follows from the behaviour of
workers and firms (e.g. Broer et al. (1999)).  We largely follow the approach of
McMorrow (1996).  The approach is very simple, but since the obtained figures do
not seem to be outperformed by more advanced econometric techniques or model
estimates we restrict ourselves to this approach.  The approach consists in
calculating an equilibrium rate from a single wage equation and can therefore be
linked to section 3.  The obtained equilibrium rate is called NAWRU
(non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment).
Rewriting equation (3) with Dwt as the dependent variable and leaving out DUt and
the tax variables we get:
) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 1 t t t t t t t t t w t pc p z z pc w U pc pc c w D - D + D + - - - - D - + D + = D - - - - q d j b a a
    (A1)
In the long run  1 1 - - - t t pc w  equals zt and Dpct equals Dpct-1.  Notice that in the long
run -given perfect foresight-  the following also holds:  1 1 - - - = - t t t
e
t pc pc pc pc
t pc D = .  Following Blanchard and Katz (1999) we then restrict a to be equal to one
(cf. (1)) then (A1) becomes:
) ( t t t t t w t pc p z U pc c w D - D + D + - D + = D q d b     (A2)Plasmans J., Meersman H., Van Poeck A. & Merlevede B , 33
Since  t t t z pc w = -  in the long run, the growth of the real wage also equals the
growth of the labour productivity in the long run, i.e.  t t t z pc w D = D - D .  Suppose also
that in the long run the difference between consumer and producer prices becomes
negligible, i.e.  0 » D - D t t pc p .  Now rewrite the above specification as follows:
) ( ) 1 ( t t t t w t t t pc p z U c z pc w D - D + D - + + = D - D - D q d b     (A3)
In the long run this reduces to:
t t w z U c D - + + = ) 1 ( 0 d b     (A4)
Some rewriting gives:
( ) [ ] ( ) b d b t w t z c U D - + - - = ) 1 ( 0     (A5)
The underlined part of the expression is the NAWRU.  This NAWRU calculation also
takes productivity growth into account.  But Blanchard and Katz (1997) argue that
‘pure’ productivity growth should have no effect on the NAIRU in the very long run.
Temporary effects are possible; if  reservation wages include employees’ aspirations
dynamic effects of productivity growth cannot be ruled out.  But then changes in
productivity growth rather than productivity growth itself should influence the
NAIRU (see for example Stiglitz (1997)).19  Skott (1998) argues that the European
data do not fit this story very well.  He proposes a minor change to the “Stiglitz”-
framework (in game theoretical form), yielding a better fit of the data.
Unfortunately none of the mentioned contributions provides a thorough empirical
examination of the proposed theories.  However productivity growth (as a
consequence of technological progress) will most of the time be accompanied by some
structural changes; combined with possible labour market rigidities this yields more
ambiguous effects on the natural rate.20  Therefore we stick to the proposed
expression.
The results of the estimation of specification (A5) are given in table A1.  We use the
estimated coefficients to compute the NAWRU, replacing actual productivity with
trend productivity based on a Hodrick-Prescott filter.  The resulting NAWRU time
series are plotted in the figures A1-A5. The increase in equilibrium unemployment is
present in all countries.  Estimates are unfortunately not perfect.  The rise in
unemployment following the oil shocks is expected to result in a level of
unemployment rising above the NAWRU; followed by a slow increase of the NAWRU
after the oil shocks.  This is only the case for France and Germany.   Calculations for
Belgium, Italy and The Netherlands do however not reflect this intuition.  The
NAWRU stays above the actual unemployment rate until about 1980.  For Belgium
and The Netherlands the calculated values in the 60s are also very high.  In the
                                                       
19 For shorter periods of time wage aspirations of the employees can be out of line with productivity
growth; if this is the case a decrease/increase in productivity growth will lead to a higher/lower NAIRU
until aspirations have adjusted to the new productivity growth.
20 See Blanchard and Katz (1997) for further details.Generosity of the Unemployment Benefit System and Wage Flexibility in EMU:
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“golden” 60s it is not impossible that the actual unemployment rate is smaller than
the NAIRU, but the differences seem to be very large.
More advanced econometric techniques used to calculate the NAIRU/NAWRU can be
found in a/o Douven (1999), Broer et al. (1999), Madsen (1998) and Gordon (1997)
(the latter only for the USA).  Madsen (1998) finds in contrast to most other studies
a declining NAIRU from the 60s  to the late 80s.  Douven (1999) calculates both a
short and a long term equilibrium rate, based on quarterly data starting after the
second oil shock.  Broer et al. (1999) use a right-to-manage model to calculate a
NAIRU for The Netherlands that follows actual unemployment more closely then
ours, but structural unemployment nevertheless also exceeds actual unemployment
from the sixties until 1982.  None of the mentioned studies, however, provides a
NAIRU that significantly outperforms -for the calculation of cyclical unemployment-
our own estimate.  We therefore restrict ourselves to the calculation as proposed by
McMorrow (1996).
Table A1: TSLS estimations of wage equations for calculation of the NAWRU
(dependent variable Dwt)












































Adj. R² 0.89 0.93 0.91 0.87 0.91
DW 1.52 1.37 2.16 1.75 1.57
___________________
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Figure A.5: The Netherlands
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